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In the Supreme Court of the State of Idaho

372 6
TREVOR JAMES BOOTH,
Peti ti oner-Respondent,

)

)
)
)

v.

)

STATE OF IDAHO,

)
)

Respondent -Appellant.

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO
AUGMENT THE RECORD
Supreme Court Docket No. 37296-2010
Canyon County Docket No. 2006-8651

)
)

A MOTION TO AUGMENT THE RECORD AND STATEMENT IN SUPPORT
THEREOF was filed by counsel for Appellant on June 11,2010. Therefore, good cause appearing,
IT HEREBY IS ORDERED that Appellant's MOTION TO AUGMENT THE RECORD be,
and hereby is, GRANTED and the augmentation record shall include the document listed below,
file stamped copies of which accompanied this Motion:
1. Order Denying Motion for Reconsideration, file-stamped April 27, 2010.
DATED this

J7-t'-day ofJune 2010.
For the Supreme Court

gtVf~~W
Stephen W. Kenyon, Cl k

cc: Counsel of Record
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CANYON COUNTY
I

IN THE DISTRlCT COURt OF THE TIDRD JUDICIAL DISTRlCT

OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, fN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON
TREVOR JAMES BOOTH,

VS.

STATE OF IDAHO,

I)

CASE NO. CV-06-08651

)
)
Petitioner,
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
Responden. )

ORDER DENYING MOTION
FOR RECONSIDERATION

i

The above-entitled cause preViout came before the Court as a trial on Trevor Booth's
I

Petition for Post Conviction Relief. On December 1, 2009, this Court entered its Findings of
Fact,. Conclusions of Law and Order Or ting Petition for Post-Conviction Relief. The state
filed a Motion to Reconsider pursuant

,0 LR.C.P 11(a)(2)(B) on December 9, 2009.

The

petitioner filed his responsive brief on March 1, 2009. No reply was filed by the state. The
Court will decide this matter without oral

~gument.

.

The main underlying determinatior of this Court in its decision was that defense counsel
fell below an objective standard of rea~onableness in one area of his representation of the
ORDER DENYING MOTION
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I

petitioner. Specifically, Trevor Booth was charged with First Degree Murder in a non-capital
I

------~~~---

case in which the state also filed a requ st that the jury be asked to. determine whether certain
statutory "aggravating circumstances," referenced in I.C. § 18-4004 (which establishes the
punishment for murder) existed. l Boot's defense counsel advised him that if he went to trial
and the jury found him guilty of First De ree Murder and also found the existence of one of the
statutory aggravating circumstances, the udge would be required to sentence him to a fixed life
sentence. Upon considering that advice Booth decided to plead guilty to the charge of First
Degree Murder in exchange for the s ate dropping its pursuit of a statutory aggravating
circumstance.

I

Standarr for Reconsideration

Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 11 (1)(2)(B) provides:
A motion for reconsideration 0lany interlocutory orders of the trial court may
be made at any time before the en ry of final judgment but not later than fourteen
(14) days after the entry of the fi al judgment. A motion for reconsideration of
any order of the trial court made ~er entry of final judgment may be filed within
fourteen (14) days from the entrpr of such order; provided, there shall be no
motion for reconsideration of 'ttl order of the trial C01l..rt entered on any
motion filed under Rules 50(a), 52fb), 55(c), 59(a), 59(e), 59.l, 60(a), or 60(b).

a~ hand, "[t]he decision to grant or deny a request for
reconsideration generally rests in the SO~d discretion of the trial court." Jordan v. Beeks, 135
Turning to the specific motion

Idaho 586, 592, 21 P.3d 908, 914 (2001)1 The trial court must: (1) perceive the issue as one of
discretion; (2) act within the outer boundaries of its discretion and consistently with the legal
standards applicable to the specific choJes available to it; and (3) reach its decision by an
I

exercise ofreason. Lettunich v. Lettunich, 145 Idaho 746, 749, 185 P.3d 258,261 (2008); Indian
Springs LLC v. Indian Springs Land Inv'J

Le, 215 P.3d 457,469 (2009).

The enumerated "aggravating circurnstan s" are reflected in I.e. § 19-2515.

ORDER DENYING MOTION
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Standard for In ffective Assistance of Counsel
In Strickland v. Washington,

466Iu.s. 668 (1984), the U.S. Supreme Court articulated a

two-part test to be employed in reviewin claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. First, the
defendant must prove that his attome 's performance fell below an objective standard of
reasonableness. fd at 688. Second, if

e reviewing court fmds that the defendant can prove

counsel's performance was constitutiona ly ineffective, then the defendant must prove that the
deficient performance resulted in prejudLe. In Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52 (1985), the U.S.
Supreme Court further clarified Strickla d in cases involving guilty pleas to require a showing
that there was "a reasonable probability hat, but for his attorney's errors, the defendant would
not have pleaded guilty and would have nsisted on going to trial." See Ray v. State, 136 Idaho
96, 982 P.2d 931 (1999).
Analysis
In its Motion to Reconsider, the tate presents three arguments. First, I.C. §18-8004 is

"patently clear: a fixed life sentence is r quired when aggravated circumstances are found in a
non-capital case ... " Second, that even ir the actual advice was wrong, defense counsel acted
reasonably.

Third, Booth failed to pre,ent any evidence to satisfy the second prong of the

Strickland test; that is, the evidence did nil t show he would have been acquitted, receive a lesser-

included offense, or a lighter sentence.
1. It is not patently clear that a ifIxed life sentence is mandatory in a non-capital
murder case. Rather, the st te's position that the defendant must receive a
mandatory :fIXed life sentence if jury finds an aggravating circumstance in a noncapital First Degree Murder cas is a statutory impossibility.
With regard to the fIrst argument, i· is not patently clear that a fixed life sentence is
required in a non-capital case. Idaho Cod §18-8004 provides:
Subject to the provisions of sectio s 19-2515 and 19-2515A, Idaho Code, every
ORDER DENYING MOTION
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I

person guilty of murder of the lrst degree shall be punished by death or by
_ _ _ _ _ _ _--!llHmlFPlHriSQIlIDent-fGI-life,-p·
ai-a-sentence-Gf-ooath-shall-not-b@-imlDpe:osSte:edc-------unless the prosecuting attorney lled written notice of intent to seek the death
penalty as required under the pr visions of section 18-4004A, Idaho Code, and
provided further that whenever le death penalty is not imposed the court shall
impose a sentence. If a jury, or e court if a jury is waived, fInds a statutory
aggravating circumstance beyond a reasonable doubt but finds that the imposition
of the death penalty would be unjlUst,
the court shall impose a fixed life sentence.
I
If a jury, or the court if a jury i$ waived, does not find a statutory aggravating
circumstance beyond a reasonablF doubt or if the death penalty is not sought,
the court shall impose a life sentence with a minimum period of confinement
of not less than ten (10) years ting which period of confmement the offender
shall not be eligible for parole or discharge or credit or reduction of sentence for
good conduct, except for merito ous service. Every person guilty of murder of
the second degree is punishable b~ imprisonment not less than ten (10) years and
the imprisonment may extend to liffe. (Emphasis added).

This Court agrees with the state tat the statute is clear and unambiguous, and that the

I

words must be given their plain, usual, ld ordinary meaning. In this case, however, it is clear
that the foregoing statute provides that Ihere the death penalty is not sought in a First Degree
Murder case, the sentencing Court shall ifPose a life sentence with a minimum fixed period of

I

ten years.

In addition, 1. C. § 19-251 5 sets foih the statutory aggravating factors the state references

in its motion.

The Court first notes that the statute is entitled: SENTENCE IN CAPITAL

CASES -- SPECIAL SENTENCING

ROCEEDING -- STATIJTORY AGGRAVATING

CIRCUMSTANCES -- SPECIAL VERn CT OR WRITTEN FINDINGS.

Subsection (5)(a)

provides:
If a erson is ad'udicated I il of murder in the fIrst de fee, whether by
acceptance of a plea of guilty, by erdict of a jury, or by decision of the trial court
sitting without a jury, and a noticb of intent to seek the death penalty was filed
and served as provided in sectioll 18-4004A, Idaho Code, a special sentencing
proceeding shall be held promptly or the purpose of hearing all relevant evidence
and arguments of counsel in aggra ation and mitigation of the offense,
(emphasis added). Based upon the fOregoJg, it is clear that only in cases in which 1) a person
ORDER DENYING MOTION
FOR RECONSIDERATION
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has been adjudicated guilty of First Degr e Murder, 2) a notice of intent to seek the death penalty
had previously been filed, and 3) a speci 1 sentencing proceeding is held at which the statutory
aggravating circumstances are presented

d found to exist, and only in that event, is the Court

I

required to issue a fixed life sentence. 2

2. Despite the fact that defens counsel vigorously and diligently pursued his
representation of Mr. Booth, hi performance in this one area fell below an objective
standard of reasonableness.
I

The state's next argument, that f'defense counsel's performance did not fall below an
objective standard of reasonableness, g es to the first prong of the Strickland test, set forth
above. This objective standard embraces a strong presumption that the claimant's counsel was
competent and diligent. More simply puf' "the standard for evaluating attorney performance is
objective reasonableness under preVailinr professional norms." Schoger v. Stat, 226 P.3d 1269
(February 1, 2010)(citing State v. Mathfws, 133 Idaho 300, 306, 986 P.2d 323, 329 (1999».
Trial counsel's tactical decisions will justify relief if the decision is shown to have resulted from
inadequate preparation, ignorance of the

~elevant

law or other shortcomings capable of objective

review." Howard v. State, 126 Idaho 231, 233,880 P.2d 261, 263 (Ct.App.l994), State v. Payne,
146 Idaho 548, 561, 199 P.3d 123, 136 (2008); Barcella v. State, 224 P.3d 536, 544 (Ct.App.

2009) McKayv. State, 225 P.3d 700, 703 (2010).
I

At the time the murder case

wJ

filed against Booth, the death penalty provisions of

Idaho law had been modified relatively rtcently (2003) to comply with the U.S Supreme Court
case of Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 602, 609, 122 S.Ct. 2428, 153 L.Ed.2d 556 (2002), which
required a jury determination of the dea

2

penalty sentencing factors. The amendment to the

Of course, the fixed life sentence is mandjtoIY only if death has been removed as a sentence pursuant to

I.e. § 19-2515(7)(b).

ORDER DENYING MOTION
FOR RECONSIDERATION
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statute included the new language to §18 4004 that is at issue in this case. 3
A lawyer does not meet the obje tively reasonable standard if, while advising a client to
take a plea offer, he fails to apprise his

c~ent of the likely sentence by making a plainly incorrect
I

estimate due to his ignorance of the appltcable law of which he should have been aware. Us. v.

Anderson, 2010 WL 1458858, 7 (D.D.C!201O), (citing United States v. Booze, 293 F.3d 516,
518 (D.C.Cir.2002); see also United Silates v.

Hanso~,

339 F.3d 983, 990 (D.C.Cir.2003).

Furthermore, lawyers must be familiar w th the federal sentencing guidelines in order to provide

effective representation in federal cajes. United Slates v. McCoy, 215 F.3d 102, 108

I

(D.C.Cir.2000».

It appears that part of the state's rrgument is that even if defense counsel's advice was

incorrect, such advice was objectively re~sonable under the circumstances.

In support of this

position, the state notes that both the ProsLution and defense counsel were highly experienced in
the field of criminal law, yet they shared the same interpretation of the statute. Further, both

.

I
I

counsel reasonably believed that this f0urt, as presiding judge in the murder case, also
interpreted the statute to be consistent

'
f

W ith

both counsels' interpretation, and that counsel's

advice to Mr. Booth was partially based 0' that understanding.
The facts of the McCoy case, supr( are similar to this case. In that case, the Court held
that counsel's performance was consti~tionallY deficient even though defense counsel's
miscalculation of the applicable

sentenc~g range was reinforced by the prosecutor, and more
I

importantly, the court never informed MCfOY of the maximum statutory penalty. See also, Us.
v. Macon,91 Fed. Appx. 239, 244 (c.A.13 CPa.) 2004),4 (McCoy case distinguished on these
facts). Therefore, even if both counsel

a~d the Court misinterpreted the statutory language in

S.L. 2003, ch. 19, § 1.
(Not selected for publication in the ederal Reporter, NO. 02-3520)
ORDER DENYING MOTION
FOR RECONSIDERATION
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I
question, advising a client of that the pourt would have no discretion other than to issue a
mandatory fixed life sentence, when

sulh is not the law, falls below an objective standard of

reasonableness.

I

l

3. The state has misstated the apJUcable legal standard applicable to the second part
of the Strickland standard.
Finally, the state argues that the vidence did not show the defendant would have been
I
acquitted, receive a lesser-included

offe~se,

or a lighter sentence. This argument assumes a

misstatement of the law. When assertinglineffective assistance of counsel with regard to a guilty
plea. a defendant does not need to

establi~h that the result of his case would have been different;
I

rather, he must establish that, but for

co~nsel's

t3r

trial. Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52 (1985) Dunlap v.

guilty and would have insisted on going
State, 141 Idaho 50,59, 106 P.3d 376,

deficient perfonnance, he would not have pled

(2004); Gilpin-Grubb v. State, 138 Idaho 76, 82, 57

P.3d 787, 793 (2002); McKeeth v. State, rr40 Idaho 847, 851, 103 P.3d 460, 464 (2004); Ray v.
State, 133 Idaho 96, 101, 983 P.2d 9311' 936 (1999); Ridgley v. State, 2010 WL 936091, 4
(March 17,2010).

I

The Court's Finding of Fact Number 29 reflects:
Although Trevor Booth's teltimony in the peR case lacked a significant
level of credibility, Richard Harris' testimony was virtually unimpeachable. His
testimony establishes that there is Jreasonable probability that, but for his opinion
and advice that I.e. §18-4004 pro~ides for a mandatory fixed life sentence in a
non-capital first degree murder c~se if a statutory aggravating circumstance is
proven, the defendant would not ave pled guilty and would have either insisted
on going to trial andlor continued t pursue some other plea agreement.
I

At a minimum, this testimony and jrecord before the Court was sufficient to establish the
requisite prejudice.
After carefully considering the

I

ar~ents presented by the state and the petitioner, as
I

well as the record in its entirety, and for tie reasons set forth above and in the Findings ofFoc!,
ORDER DENYING MOTION
FOR RECONSIDERATION
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Conclusions of Law and Order Granting

~etition for Post-Conviction Relief entered December 1,

----~--2-0-0-9-,th-e state's Motion to Reconsider islHEREBY DENIED.
Dated this

'~ay of April, 2010,
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I
I

CERTIF~CATE OF SERVICE:

~e

The undersigned does hereby certify that
an;correct copy of the foregoing document was
served by the following method indicated below to each of the following:
Ty Ketlinski
Canyon County Prosecuting Attorney
Canyon County Courthouse
1115 Albany St.
Caldwell,ID 83605

II

i

___ u. S. Mail, postage prepaid
___ Telecopy/fax
)( Personally delivered

Van Bishop
203 12th Ave. Rd, Suite B
Nampa,ID 83686
___ U. S. Mail, postage prepaid
___ Telecopy/fax

Y

Personally delivered

DATED this

~
27111day o
f , 2010 .
.

ditltlJJ4

Deputy Clerk
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